Towards better understanding the challenges of reliable and trust-aware critical communications in the aftermath of disaster by Radenkovic, Milena et al.
Towards Better Understanding the Challenges of
Reliable and Trust-Aware Critical Communications in
the Aftermath of Disaster
Milena Radenkovic, Adam Walker, Li Bai




Abstract—This paper seeks to better understand the highly
multi-dimensional, multi-faceted challenges of meeting trust and
reliability requirements in critical, disaster aftermath
communication networks comprising heterogeneous groups of
nodes. Through emulation of a UK based flooding event in the
South of England we show the impact of selfish and malicious
nodes on disaster communications when disparate, distributed,
and disconnected nodes are carrying sensitive messages relating to
resource availability and need. To further support the need for
trust-aware schemes in such environments we compare
benchmark DTN protocols against our reliable, trust-aware
framework, TACID, which penalises and excludes malicious
nodes. We show that in disaster aftermath networks trust-aware
schemes can significantly reduce the impact of malicious
intermediary nodes and increase overall reliability whilst
simultaneously maintaining message confidentiality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Severe weather events such as storms and flooding are the
single costliest natural hazard in Europe, both financially and in
terms of human fatalities [1]. Violent storms and widespread
flooding are expected due to climate change to become
significantly more frequent and severe both within the UK and
throughout Europe with rising numbers of people and regions at
risk [2]. This paper focuses on the emergency phase of a natural
disaster, the days to weeks after impact where urgent issues are
dealt with prior to any substantial recovery [3]. During this
period the environment is typically hazardous and there is a
significant challenge in distributing much needed life and health
sustaining resources which are dispersed amongst various user
groups within the region [4] [5]. Natural disasters present
challenging scenarios for communication with prolonged
reduced performance of networking infrastructure resulting
from equipment damage and network overload [6] [7]. Activities
conducted in the emergency phase of a natural disaster are often
distributed across a large area of harsh terrain and carried out by
heterogeneous response teams. Intra and inter group
communication within the affected area and outside is essential
for effective orchestration of action [4] [8] [9] [10].
Whilst much state-of-the-art research has considered
improving energy efficiency and communication reliability in
emergency environments [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18],
we address the problem of malicious nodes coordinating attacks
such as misrepresentation and denial of service (DoS) in order
gain unfair resource acquisition advantage and prevent others
from obtaining supplies. Such attacks can be challenging to
detect due to selective targeting based upon a malicious node’s
resource bias. To mitigate the impact of resource-related attacks
by biased, selfish, and malicious nodes we propose a novel,
distributed, decentralised, adaptive, collaborative, scalable
framework for Trust-Aware Communications in Disaster –
TACID. Our framework builds upon lessons learned from
AdaptAnon [19] and OCOT-AA [20] and uses localised,
predictive, real-time analytics derived from collaborative multi-
dimensional multi-natured complex temporal graphs. TACID is
a peer to peer, reputation and trust-aware approach for reliable
and secure dissemination of sensitive resource-related
communications amongst heterogeneous user groups in highly
challenging, large-scale, distributed, delay and disconnection
prone environments with hostile nodes present.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we provide an overview of related work. Section 3
describes the multi-layer, multi-dimensional complex
challenges and gives the architectural and functional overview
of TACID. In Section 4 we present an evaluation of TACID
using a pseudo-realistic UK flooding-based scenario. We
conclude the paper in Section 5 by summarising our findings and
identifying several key areas for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
AdaptAnon [19] proposes a multi-dimensional K-anonymity
overlay for opportunistic networks which uses fully localised
heuristics to adaptively balance the dynamic trade-offs between
degree of anonymity and quality of service (QoS). OCOT-AA
[20] extends [19] with a complementary self-organised,
efficient, collaborative reputation mechanism for locally testing
peer obfuscators. E3F [11] builds upon [21] [22] to propose an
energy-aware cross-layer emergency communications
framework for large-scale disasters which uses adaptive mobile-
social forwarding and real-time analytics to avoid both
congestion and energy depletion amongst heterogeneous users.
Trust-aware schemes for opportunistic disaster
communication networks have been proposed by [13] [14] [15]
[16] [17]. In [13] observer nodes are injected into the network to
monitor routing behaviour and update a global reputation
matrix. GREAT [14] uses statistical estimation of values from
select nodes’ evaluations of user interactions to assign trust
values. CFV [15] is a combined faith value mechanism for
countering maliciously routing nodes conducting denial of
service attacks. CTMS [16] uses a collaborative trust scheme to
detect and prevent malicious node behaviour.
Disaster communications proposals have investigated a
range of scenarios. Triage situations consider victims, medical
responders, command points, and external stations requiring
reliable communication with low-latency to support critical
communications [18]. Aframework for dynamic prioritisation of
messages amongst civilians and organisations in the emergency
phase was given in [23], which proposes a context-aware multi-
layer architecture for a range of services, including a localised
civilian-to-civilian resource market. In [24] an application is
described which provides interoperability with social-media for
disaster communication. A smartphone-based platform for
disaster communications is proposed by [25], in which mobile
devices form wireless mesh networks supporting distributed
message relaying and real-time communication.
Existing work largely focuses on communication between
select groups operating in a disaster affected regions during the
emergency phase. Current trust-aware schemes for emergency
phase opportunistic networks do not consider malicious routing
misbehaviour incentivised by selfish desire to unfairly obtain
resources. We identify the need for reliable, social and trust-
aware resource-related communication amongst a broad range
of heterogeneous groups active within a disaster affected region
during the emergency phase in the presence of malicious nodes.
III. TACID ARCHITECTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL
OVERVIEW
A. Multi-Dimensional & Multi-Layer Overview
In this section we provide the architectural and functional
overview of TACID, a novel, cross-layer, multi-dimensional,
trust, social, and resource aware framework which uses localised
decision making and real-time predictive analytics to support
reliable delivery of sensitive critical resource communications
in the aftermath of disaster amongst heterogeneous user groups.
TACID builds upon [11] [19] [20] with an adaptive, integrated,
cross-layer hybrid trust mechanism which combines multi-
dimensional real-time first-hand neighbour behaviour analysis
with second hand trust values propagated through the network
by peers.
Our TACID framework proposes an architecture for trust-
aware disaster communications which addresses the multi-
dimensionality shown in Figure 1. These dimensions include:
device resources such as battery, buffer, and computation;
publish and subscribe of transient resource availability – nodes
in need and nodes with supply; multi-layer complex temporal
graphs such as those represented by the social and physical
layers; trust and vulnerability of nodes including potentially
selfish and malicious users. TACID seeks to balance the
complex dynamic trade-offs of these dimensions in addition to
the delay and disconnection tolerance demands required of
highly challenging, multi-natured, dynamic, complex temporal
networks. We present TACID as a unified trust-aware
framework for supporting a wide range of resource-driven
services for groups operating in hostile disaster regions.
Fig. 1. Multi-dimensional challenges of reliable trust-aware disaster
communications
Fig. 2. Multi-layer overview
The multiple layers and high dimensionality of the problem
space which TACID seeks to reconcile are shown in Figure 2.
At the physical and network layer are heterogeneous user groups
conducting disparate activity within the disaster impacted area.
These user groups include emergency services and individuals,
amongst those given in Subsection E. The geo-temporal physical
layer permits only sporadic multi-hop communications between
user groups who carry devices of varying capabilities. Atop the
physical layer is the social ego-network layer. A node’s ego-
network graph describes its past encounters through statistics
including centrality, similarity, and tie-strength. These analytics
can be used to predict future encounters and adapt to social
conditions. The resource layer highlights the transient and
distributed nature of various resources amongst nodes. Example
resources include water, medication, and equipment. Our
TACID framework unifies the layers shown in Figure 2 through
cross-layer predictive analytics, multi-dimensional peer
behaviour analysis, and collaborative trust exchange to support
reliable resource-related communications in emergency phase
communications.
TACID is resilient to malicious and selfish behaviour
including DoS and biased routing of messages pertaining to
certain resources. Each TACID node performs long-term, multi-
dimensional peer behaviour analysis (Subsection B) and
participates in collaborative localised reputation exchange to
propagate trust values throughout the network (Subsection C).
TACID nodes consider trust via categories of resource-related
messages. Each node therefore maintains multiple trust-values
for each contact depending on its behaviour routing messages
relating to a certain resource. This gives TACID an advantage
over existing schemes in taking advantage of selfish nodes for
routing messages for which they have no observed bias.
Identified malicious and selfish nodes are penalised through a
reduction in trust value which greatly limits their ability to
disseminate their own messages pertaining to resource need.
B. Adaptive Cross-Layer Trust Computation
TACID nodes compute first-hand trust based multiple
criteria including behaviour, interactions, and labelling. All
TACID nodes act as observers, each monitoring the routing
behaviour of nodes it has encountered and where possible
acquiring verified trust labels from authenticated groups such as
emergency services. The routing behaviour of nodes is
monitored to identify selective message dropping as well as
rogue routing of messages advertising resource availability (or
need) away from known best destinations. Each TACID node
gathers analytics of which nodes carry resources through
inspection of messages which it overhears being exchanged
locally or carries itself. For this version of TACID each nodes
calculates trust from observed behaviour ߬ according to seen
resources as in (1), where ߮ఘ is the ratio of forwarded messages
to received messages for resource ߩ and ߢఘ is the ratio of
messages ݉ forwards to known best contacts for a resource. As
TACID nodes categorise behaviour according to seen resources,
we use these observed ratings to provide a general estimation of
trust for an as yet unseen resource using (2).
௡߬,ఘ,௧(݉ ) = ߮ߩ ∙ ߢఘ (1)
௡߬,ఘ,௧(݉ ) = ∑ ఛ೙ ,ഐ೔,೟(௠ )ೃ೔సభ ோ (2)
C. Collaborative Trust & Context Exchange
TACID nodes propagate local knowledge, including peer
trust values, through collaborative information exchange. On
meeting, each TACID node exchanges a summary vector
comprising of identity information and multi-dimensional
locally calculated aggregate analytics derived from interactions
with other nodes. These cross-layer analytics (i) surmise the
nodes perspective of its ego-network through interaction
statistics and centrality calculations, (ii) describe the trust of its
ego network, and (iii) provide geo-temporal resource availability
from encounter analytics.
Ego-network analytics describe the node’s social graph
through statistical methods. For predictive ego-network
analytics TACID builds upon [21] maintaining metrics including
similarity, tie-strength and centrality. The current known state of
the resource graph from the perspective of the summary vector
sending node is provided through resource availability analytics
which are calculated for the ego-network. Summary vectors
contain trust values for the entire ego-network.
A TACID node receiving a summary vector integrates its
peers knowledge with dynamic weighting calculated using the
trust the computing node places is its neighbour for each
resource rating provided. In this way TACID nodes place greater
belief in information received from highly trusted versus
information received from suspect nodes. Information is
aggregated with local knowledge for trust, resources, and ego-
network. Trust aggregation is shown in (2) where node ݊
receives a summary vector from ݉ about its ego-network ܧ.
௡ܶ,ఘ,௧(݉ ) = ∑ ఛ೙ ,ഐ,೟షభ(௠ )∙ఛ೙ ,ഐ,೟షభ(௘೔)ಶ೔సభ ఛ೙,ഐ,೟షభ∙ெ (2)
Recommendation attacks involve malicious nodes
disseminating falsified trust values so as to increase or decrease
the perceived trust of themselves or colluding nodes, thereby
increasing their influence. Each TACID node locally computes
trust values from second hand neighbour ratings and directly
observed behaviour which prevents malicious nodes acting
alone from successfully manipulating their trust value. To
impede collusion recommendation attacks TACID nodes will
update their local analytics from newly received summary
vectors with a frequency limited by a function of the inter-
contact time of its ego-network. For this version of TACID a
node will update its local information from a received summary
vector providing an interval has passed which is longer than one
standard deviation from the incremental exponentially weighted
moving average inter-contact time of its ego-network.
D. Adaptive & Predictive Trust-Aware Forwarding
Post-initialisation TACID is fully self-adaptive and TACID
nodes make forwarding decisions based on predictive analytics
of the dynamic social, trust, and resource graphs. Whether to use
available immediate contacts as next hops is determined based
on multi-dimensional comparison with potential future message
forwarding opportunities. To determine appropriate next hops
for messages from available contacts TACID nodes use a
forwarding heuristic building on [21] which combines multiple
utility functions to rank current contacts in terms of suitability.
The forwarding heuristic proposed in [21] is shown in (3). Node
݊ determines whether to forward a message to contact ݉ by
summing the ego-network utilities (similarity of contacts, degree
centrality, and tie strength) and multiplying this with the
availability of the contact (further defined through message
receptiveness and retentiveness) [21].
ܥ௡(݉ ) = (ܵ݅ ݉ ܷ௡(݉ ) + ݀ାܷ + ܷܶܵ ௡(݀)) ∙ ܣݒ௡ (3)
We extend the multi-dimensional social adaptive forwarding
heuristic (3) proposed by [21] with support for geo-temporal
resource availability utility (4) and trust utility (5). Our TACID
forwarding heuristic is shown in (6).
ܴܷ௡,ఘ,௧(݉ ) = ோ೙ ,ഐ,೟(௠ )ோ೙,ഐ,೟(௠ )ାோ೘ ,ഐ,೟(௡) (4)
ܷܶ௡,ఘ,௧(݉ ) = ೙்,ഐ,೟(௠ )
೙்,ഐ,೟(௠ )ା ೘் ,ഐ,೟(௡) (5)
ܨ௡,ఘ,௧(݉ ) = ൫ܥ௡,௧(݉ ) + ܴܷ௡,ఘ,௧(݉ )൯∙ ܷܶ௡,ఘ,௧(݉ ) (6)
E. Defined User Groups
Existing work has sought to categorise user-groups operating
in disaster according to a range of criteria including device
capability, energy, and mobility [11] [18] [26] [27]. Building
upon existing works [27] [23] we find 6 distinct groups which
need trust-aware communication in a region affected by disaster:
(i) emergency services, (ii) aid groups, (iii) businesses, (iv)
healthy and injured individuals, (v) external groups, and (vi)
sensors. These user groups are extended combinations of those
defined in existing literature and are based on mobility,
authenticatable trust categorisation, resources, and device
capability. Figure 3 shows the dynamic trust scale for user
groups.
Fig. 3. Trust scale with initial trust indicated for core groups
1) Emergency Services: Emergency services are the most
authoritative groups and are highly trusted. Mobile emergency
service teams handle direct resource distribution and can
perform node identification and verification of trust levels that
have been dynamically computed. Static emergency service
stations serve as resource depots and have powerful
communications equipment, likely serving as gateways to
external agencies.
2) Volunteer Aid Groups: Static and mobile volunteer aid
and rescue groups operate under the coordination and authority
of emergency services, distributing resources and equipment.
Trust and identity can be readily established for members of
such groups and thus trust in them is moderately high.
3) Businesses: Operational shops act as resource hubs and
carry surplus supplies. Trust in companies is moderate though
they may operate as gateways to external groups including
supply chains and external organisations.
4) Individuals: Individuals in the disaster area conduct a
wide range of activity including assisting with aid operations
and awaiting medical treatment. The majority of individuals in
the disaster area can be in need of resources with varying
urgency though some may have surplus available. Individuals
may therefore be consumers as well as suppliers. All individuals
are considered initially untrusted.
5) Sensors: Sensors have limited device resources such as
energy and memory but can participate unbiased in the relaying
of critical messages between nodes. Sensor services are capable
of providing crucial real-time analysis and predict the future
status of areas in the affected region.
6) External Organisations: Communication with external
organisations in the aftermath of disaster is crucial for
coordination of future supplies. Data from these groups permits
predictive dissemination of resources. Out-of-band
communication with associations external to the affected region
can be conducted through gateway nodes which may have trust
levels incompatible with the organisations they provide access
to.
IV. EXPERIMENT SETUP AND EVALUATION
TABLE I. ONE PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Total Number of Nodes 500
Individuals 300 (10% injured)
Emergency Service Stations 19
Duration 24 hours
Radio Range - 100m for mobile nodes- 1000m for static base stations
Message TTL 1 hour
0 2MB/s
User Groups
- Search and Rescue
- Injured & Healthy Individuals
- Static Emergency Services
- Mobile Emergency Services
- Businesses
- Volunteer Aid Groups
- Sensors
Runs 20
To explore the impact of malicious nodes on disaster
communication networks we use a simulation of a severe flood
in North Somerset, UK. North Somerset is a low lying coastal
county in southwestern England with a population of 211,681.
The region covers approximately 375 km2 and encompasses the
North Somerset Levels, a large area of coastal plain. North
Somerset experiences frequent flooding and, despite defences,
multiple populated areas remain at severe risk according to UK
government flood forecasting.
The scenario was run using ONE [28] with the parameters
shown in Table 1. For each group given in Section 3 and for
every layer shown in Figure 2, multiple complimentary real-
world data-sets were overlain to drive the flood scenario. Where
appropriate, further consideration was given to subgroups such
as to distinguish between the behaviour of injured and healthy
individuals. Mobility models for each mobile group is pseudo-
realistic and derived from existing trace and expert driven
models [27] [29] [30]. Static emergency service stations and
businesses were obtained from official data with those that fall
within an area of flood risk assumed incapacitated and therefore
removed. These points as act as resource depots with emergency
service stations additionally serving as coordination centres for
mobile rescue and aid groups. Coastal and river flood sensors
are placed at strategic shoreline locations and along certain
waterways and include existing wave buoys and projected static
sensors. These sensors transmit at regular intervals. As in [27],
we model two categories of individuals, injured and healthy.
Through extensive in-depth contact analysis of single and
multi-hop contacts in the devised trace we observed that
connectivity between injured victims of limited mobility and
emergency services proved to be the most challenging in the
presented disaster scenario. The nodes in most frequent contact
with injured individuals are healthy individuals and so to create
a maximally hostile scenario we distribute malicious nodes
randomly amongst this group. To explore the extent to which
malicious nodes can intercept sensitive critical messages in an
opportunistic network operating in the aftermath of disaster we
initially compare the performance of 2 benchmark protocols:
Epidemic and First Contact. We then evaluate these against
TACID. We define a successful message delivery as one where
malicious nodes are not used as intermediary hops and receive
no sensitive resource requests from vulnerable nodes in need of
supplies. This strict definition considers that any messages
intercepted by attackers immediately present a risk to the safety
of the vulnerable source node regardless of whether they are also
received by the trusted destination node.
Figure 4 shows the performance of the protocols in the
disaster scenario when there are no malicious nodes in the
network. Both replication-based routing schemes achieve
delivery ratios over 75%. First Contact performs poorly,
delivering less than 5% of messages successfully to emergency
service stations. This is due to the high hop count (median of 6
hops per message) and multi-dimensional heterogeneity of
nodes. When malicious individuals are included, the success
ratio drops considerably. Figure 5 shows the percentage of
messages delivered without interception by malicious nodes.
Under 5% of resource requests sent from vulnerable nodes are
safely received by emergency services when just 10% of
individuals are eavesdropping on routed messages. Neither
Epidemic, nor First Contact successfully deliver any messages
when over 30% of nodes are malicious. TACID achieves
substantially higher delivery with over 10 times as many
messages reaching the destination uncompromised. This is the
result of the trust scheme actively avoiding low rated nodes.
Figure 6 shows the average end-to-end delay for successfully
delivered uncompromised messages. With routes avoiding
intermediary malicious hops closer to the destination we see an
increase in delay from under 2 hours 45 minutes to 3 hours 30
minutes. This 45 minutes increase in delay represents the trade-
off made between delivering messages as early as possible and
delivering messages uncompromised. First contact doesn’t
manage to deliver any messages with over 20% malicious nodes.
Fig. 4. Percentage of messages successfully delivered when there are no
malicious nodes
Fig. 5. Percentage messages delivered uncompromised with increasing
malicious nodes
Fig. 6. End-to-end delay for messages successfully delivered without being
compromised
V. CONCLUSION
This paper explored the need for trust-aware schemes in
disaster communications and identified the complex challenges
of trust-based schemes for supporting services for a diverse
range of nodes in the emergency phase. We proposed TACID, a
collaborative, predictive, adaptive, scalable framework for trust-
aware heterogeneous disaster communications in the presence
of hostile nodes. In investigating the impact of malicious noes in
emergency phase communications we compared benchmark
DTN protocols and found high rates of interception even at low
rates of malicious nodes with performance vastly improving
with introduction of a trust mechanism, highlighting the need for
such a scheme.
For this work we did not address time-critical life-
threatening emergency requests requiring urgent intervention
and so in future work we will focus further on quality of service
requirements with respect to security. We will further consider
the nature of resources and supply and demand amongst
heterogeneous user groups and refine further the requirements
of these multi-dimensional complex networks. In further
exploration we will use more traces to better understand the
challenges across diverse disaster scenarios (e.g. flooding,
landslides) in a diverse range of geographic regions and compare
against state-of-the-art trust-aware schemes for DTNs.
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